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Abstract
Recent work on adversarial perturbations
shows that there is an inherent trade-off be-
tween standard test accuracy and adversar-
ial accuracy. Specifically, it is shown that
no classifier can simultaneously be robust to
adversarial perturbations and achieve high
standard test accuracy. However, this is con-
trary to the standard notion that on tasks
such as image classification, humans are ro-
bust classifiers with low error rate. In this
work, we show that the main reason be-
hind this confusion is the inexact definition
of adversarial perturbation that is used in
the literature. To fix this issue, we pro-
pose a slight, yet important modification to
the existing definition of adversarial pertur-
bation. Based on the modified definition, we
show that there is no trade-off between ad-
versarial and standard accuracies; there exist
classifiers that are robust and achieve high
standard accuracy. We further study several
properties of this new definition of adversar-
ial risk and its relation to the existing defini-
tion.
1 Introduction
Recent works have shown that the output of deep neu-
ral networks is vulnerable to even a small amount
of perturbation to the input [Goodfellow et al., 2014,
Szegedy et al., 2013]. These perturbations, usually re-
ferred to as “adversarial” perturbations, are imperceiv-
able by humans and can deceive even state-of-the-art
models to make incorrect predictions. Consequently, a
line of work in deep learning has focused on defending
against such attacks/perturbations [Goodfellow et al.,
2014, Carlini and Wagner, 2016, Ilyas et al., 2017,
Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Ar-
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Madry et al., 2017]. This has resulted in several tech-
niques for learning models that are robust to adversar-
ial attacks. However, many of these techniques were
later shown to be ineffective [Athalye and Sutskever,
2017, Carlini and Wagner, 2017, Athalye et al., 2018].
We present a brief review of existing literature on ad-
versarial robustness, that is necessarily incomplete.
Existing works define an adversarial perturbation at
a point x, for a classifier f as any perturbation δ
with a small norm, measured w.r.t some distance met-
ric, which changes the output of the classifier; that is
f(x + δ) 6= f(x). Most of the existing techniques for
learning robust models minimize the following worst
case loss over all possible perturbations
E(x,y)∼P
[
max
δ:||δ||≤ǫ
ℓ(f(x+ δ), y)
]
. (1)
Goodfellow et al. [2014], Carlini and Wagner [2017],
Madry et al. [2017] use heuristics to approximately
minimize the above objective. In each iteration of the
optimization, these techniques first use heuristics to
approximately solve the inner maximization problem
and then compute a descent direction using the result-
ing maximizers. Tsuzuku et al. [2018] provide a train-
ing algorithm which tries to find large margin clas-
sifiers with small Lipschitz constants, thus ensuring
robustness to adversarial perturbations. A recent line
of work has focused on optimizing an upper bound
of the above objective. Raghunathan et al. [2018],
Kolter and Wong [2017] provide SDP and LP based
upper bound relaxations of the objective, which can
be solved efficiently for small networks. These tech-
niques have the added advantage that they can be used
to formally verify the robustness of any given model.
Sinha et al. [2017] propose to optimize the following
distributional robustness objective, which is a stronger
form of robustness than the one used in Equation (1)
min
f
sup
Q:W (P,Q)≤ǫ
E(x,y)∼Q [ℓ(f(x), y)] , (2)
where W (P,Q) is the Wasserstein distance between
probability distributions P,Q.
Another line of work on adversarial robustness has
focused on studying adversarial risk from a theo-
retical perspective. Recently, Schmidt et al. [2018],
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Bubeck et al. [2018] study the generalization prop-
erties of adversarial risk and compare it with the
generalization properties of standard risk (P(y 6=
f(x))). Fawzi et al. [2018], Fawzi et al. [2018],
Franceschi et al. [2018] study the properties of adver-
sarial perturbations and adversarial risk. These works
characterize the robustness at a point x in terms of
how much perturbation a classifier can tolerate at a
point, without changing its prediction
r(x) = min
δ∈S
||δ|| s.t. sign(f(x)) 6= sign(f(x+ δ)), (3)
where S is some subspace. Fawzi et al. [2018] theoret-
ically study the expected adversarial radius (E[r(x)])
of any classifier f and suggest that there is a trade-
off between adversarial robustness and the standard
accuracy. Specifically, their results suggest that if the
prediction accuracy is high then E[r(x)] could be small.
However, these results are contrary to the standard
notion that on tasks such as image classification, hu-
mans are robust classifiers with low error rate. A care-
ful inspection of the definition of adversarial perturba-
tion and adversarial radius used in Equations (1),(3)
brings into light the inexactness of these definitions.
For example, consider the definition of adversarial risk
in Equation (1). A major issue with this definition
is that it assumes the label y remains the same in a
neighborhood of x, and penalizes any classifier which
doesn’t output y in the entire neighborhood of x. How-
ever, the response variable need not remain the same
in the neighborhood of x. If a perturbation δ is such
that “true label” at x is not the same as the “true la-
bel” at x+ δ then the classifier shouldn’t be penalized
for not predicting y at x+δ. Moreover, such a pertur-
bation shouldn’t be considered as adversarial, since it
changes the true label at x+δ. Figure 1 illustrates this
phenomenon on MNIST and CIFAR-10. As we show
later in the paper, this inexact definition of adversar-
ial perturbation has resulted in recent works claiming
that there exists a trade-off between adversarial and
standard risks.
To be more concrete, consider two points (x, 1) and
(x+δ,−1) which are close to each other (i.e., ‖δ‖ ≤ ǫ).
Then for any classifier to be correct at the two points,
it has to change its prediction for the two points over
a small region, which would mean that the adversarial
radius, r(x), is very small. This shows that in order to
have high accuracy, a classifier will have to change its
score over a small region, leading to a small adversarial
radius. This creates the illusion of a trade-off between
adversarial robustness and standard risk. This illusion
arises because of the above definitions of adversarial
perturbation which consider the perturbation δ at x
to be adversarial. On the contrary, δ shouldn’t be con-
sidered adversarial because the true label at x + δ is
not the same as the label at x. This confusion moti-
vates the need for a clear definition of an adversarial
(a) MNIST (L0) (b) CIFAR-10 (L2)
Figure 1: Images from Sharif et al. [2018] showing that
small perturbations can change the true label of the
perturbed image, and which thus should perhaps not
be viewed as “adversarial” perturbations. Left and
right images in each sub-figure correspond to the orig-
inal and perturbed images respectively. 4.5% of the
pixels are corrupted by the L0 adversary and L2 norm
bound ǫ = 6 for the L2 adversary.
perturbation, the corresponding adversarial risk, and
then studying these quantities.
Contributions. In this work, we first formally de-
fine the notions of adversarial perturbation, adversar-
ial risk, which address the above described issue with
the existing definition of adversarial risk. Next, we
present two key sets of results. One set of results per-
tain to our modified definition of adversarial risk (Sec-
tions 4, 6). In Section 4 we show that the minimizers
of both adversarial and standard training objectives
are Bayes optimal classifiers. This shows that there
is no trade-off between adversarial and standard risks
and there exist classifiers which have low adversarial
and standard risks. Despite this result, in Section 6,
we show that there is a need for adversarial training.
The second set of results in Section 5 analyze the ex-
isting definition of adversarial risk to answer some nat-
ural questions that come up in light of our results in
Section 4. Specifically, we study the conditions un-
der which similar results as in Section 4 hold for the
existing definition of adversarial risk.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we set up the notation and review nec-
essary background on risk minimization. To simplify
the presentation in the paper, we only consider the
binary classification problem. However, it is straight-
forward to extend the results and analysis in this paper
to multi-class classification.
Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {−1, 1} denote the covariate, label
pair which follows a probability distribution P . Let
Sn = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 be n i.i.d samples drawn from P .
Let f : Rd → R denote a score based classifier, which
assigns x to class 1, if f(x) > 0. We define the popu-
lation and empirical risks of classifier f as
R0−1(f) = E(x,y)∼P [ℓ0−1(f(x), y)] ,
Rn,0−1(f) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ0−1(f(xi), yi),
where ℓ0−1(·, ·) is defined as
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ℓ0−1(f(x), y) = I(sign(f(x)) 6= y), and sign(α) = 1 if
α > 0 and −1 otherwise. Given Sn, the objective of
empirical risk minimization (ERM) is to estimate a
classifier with low population risk R(f). Since opti-
mization of 0/1 loss is computationally intractable,
it is often replaced with a convex surrogate loss
function ℓ(f(x), y) = φ(yf(x)), where φ : R→ [0,∞).
Logistic loss is a popularly used surrogate loss and
is defined as ℓ(f(x), y) = log(1 + e−yf(x)). We let
R(f), Rn(f) denote the population and empirical
risk functions obtained by replacing ℓ0−1 with ℓ in
R0−1(f), Rn,0−1(f).
A score based classifier f∗ is called Bayes optimal clas-
sifier if sign(f∗(x)) = sign(2P (y = 1|x)−1) a.e. on the
support of distribution P . We call η(x) = sign(f∗(x))
as Bayes decision rule. Note that the Bayes decision
rule need not be unique. We assume that the set of
points where P (y = 1|x) = 12 has measure 0.
3 Adversarial Risk
In this paper, we focus on the following robustness
setting, which is also the focus of most of the past
works on adversarial robustness: given a pre-trained
model, there is an adversary which corrupts the inputs
to the model such that the corrupted inputs lead to
certain “unwanted” behavior in the model. Our goal is
to design models that are robust to such adversaries.
In what follows, we make the notions of an adversary,
unwanted behavior more concrete and formally define
adversarial perturbation and adversarial risk.
Let A : Rd → Rd be an adversary which modifies any
given data point x to A(x). Let δx = A(x)−x be the
perturbation chosen by the adversary at x. We assume
that the perturbations are norm bounded, which is a
standard restriction imposed on the capability of the
adversary.
Our definition of adversarial perturbation is based on
a reference or a base classifier. For example, in vi-
sion tasks, this base classifier is the human vision sys-
tem. A perturbation is adversarial to a classifier if it
changes the prediction of the classifier, whereas the
base/reference classifier assigns it to the same class as
the unperturbed point.
Definition 1 (Adversarial Perturbation). Let
f : Rd → R be a score based classifier and
g : Rd → {−1, 1} be a base classifier. Then the
perturbation δx chosen by an adversary A at x is
said to be adversarial for f , w.r.t base classifier g, if
‖δx‖ ≤ ǫ and
sign(f(x)) = g(x), g(x) = g(x+ δx),
and
sign(f(x+ δx)) 6= g(x).
Equivalently, a perturbation δx is said to be adver-
sarial for f , w.r.t base classifier g, if ‖δx‖ ≤ ǫ,
g(x) = g(x+ δx) and
ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δx), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f(x), g(x)) = 1.
Note that, unlike the existing notion of adversarial
risk, the above definition doesn’t consider a pertur-
bation as adversarial if it changes the label of the
base classifier. Moreover, if f disagrees with g at x,
then the perturbation δx is not considered adversar-
ial. This is reasonable because if f(x) disagrees with
g(x), it should be treated as a standard classification
error rather than adversarial error. Using the above
definition of adversarial perturbation, we next define
adversarial risk.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Risk). Let f : Rd → R be
a score based classifier and g : Rd → {−1, 1} be a base
classifier. The adversarial risk of f w.r.t base classifier
g and adversary A is defined as the fraction of points
which can be adversarially perturbed by A
Radv,0−1(f) = E [ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δx), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f(x), g(x))] .
It is typically assumed that the adversary A is an “op-
timal” adversary; that is, at any give point x, A tries
to find a perturbation that is adversarial for f
δx ∈ argmax
‖δ‖≤ǫ
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δ), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f(x), g(x)) .
The adversarial risk of a classifier f w.r.t an optimal
adversary can then be written as
E

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δ), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f(x), g(x))

 .
In the sequel, we assume that the adversary is optimal
and work with the above definition of adversarial risk.
Let Radv(f) denote the adversarial risk obtained by
replacing ℓ0−1 with a convex surrogate loss ℓ and let
Rn,adv(f) denote its empirical version. In the sequel
we refer to R(f), Radv(f) as standard and adversar-
ial risks and Rn(f), Rn,adv(f) as the corresponding
empirical risks. The goal of adversarial training is to
learn a classifier that has low adversarial and standard
risks. One natural technique to estimate such a robust
classifier is to minimize a linear combination of both
the risks
argmin
f∈F
R(f) + λRadv(f), (4)
where F is an appropriately chosen function class and
λ ≥ 0 is a hyper-parameter. The tuning parameter λ
trades off standard risk with the excess risk incurred
from adversarial perturbations, and allows us to tune
the conservativeness of our classifier.
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4 Bayes Optimal Classifier as Base
Classifier
In this section we study the properties of minimizers
of objective (4), under the assumption that the base
classifier g(x) is a Bayes optimal classifier. This is a
reasonable assumption because if we are interested in
robustness with respect to a base classifier, it is likely
we are getting labels from the base classifier itself. For
instance, in many classification tasks the labels are
generated by humans (i.e., human is a Bayes optimal
classifier for the classification task) and robustness is
also measured w.r.t a human. The following Theorem
shows that under this condition, the minimizers of (4)
are Bayes optimal.
Theorem 1. Suppose the hypothesis class F is the set
of all measurable functions. Let the base classifier g(x)
be a Bayes optimal classifier.
1. (0/1 loss). If ℓ is the 0/1 loss, then any mini-
mizer fˆ of
min
f∈F
R0−1(f) + λRadv,0−1(f),
is a Bayes optimal classifier.
2. (Logistic loss). Suppose ℓ is the logistic loss and
suppose the probability distribution P is such that∣∣P (y = 1|x)− 12 ∣∣ > γ a.e., for some positive con-
stant γ. Then any minimizer of Equation (4) is
a Bayes optimal classifier.
The first part of the above Theorem shows that mini-
mizing the joint objective with 0/1 loss, for any choice
of λ ≥ 0, results in a Bayes optimal classifier. This
shows that there exist classifiers that are both robust
and achieve high standard accuracy and there is no
trade-off between adversarial and standard risks. More
importantly, the Theorem shows that if there exists a
unique Bayes decision rule (i.e., sign(f∗1 ) = sign(f
∗
2 )
a.e. for any two Bayes optimal classifiers f1, f2), then
standard training suffices to learn robust classifiers and
there is no need for adversarial training.
The second part of the Theorem, which is perhaps the
more interesting result, shows that using a convex sur-
rogate for the 0/1 loss to minimize the joint objective
also results in Bayes optimal classifiers. This result as-
sures us that optimizing a convex surrogate does not
hinder our search for a robust classifier that has low ad-
versarial and standard risks. Finally, we note that the
requirement on conditional class probability P (y|x) is
a mild condition as γ can be any small positive con-
stant close to 0.
4.1 Approximate Bayes Optimal Classifier as
Base Classifier
We now briefly discuss the scenario where the base
classifier g(x) is not Bayes optimal. In this setting, the
minimizers of the objective (4) need not be Bayes opti-
mal. The first term in the objective will bias the opti-
mization towards a Bayes optimal classifier. Whereas,
the second term in the joint objective will bias the op-
timization towards the base classifier. Since the base
classifier is not a Bayes optimal classifier, this results
in a trade-off between the two terms, which is con-
trolled by the tuning parameter λ. If λ is small, then
the minimizers of the joint objective will be close to a
Bayes optimal classifier. If λ is large, the minimizers
will be close to the base classifier.
5 Old definition of Adversarial Risk
One natural question that Section 4 gives rise to is
whether the results in Theorem 1 also hold for the def-
inition of adversarial risk used by the existing works.
To answer this question, we now study the properties
of minimizers of the adversarial training objective in
Equation (1). We start by making a slight modifica-
tion to the definition of adversarial risk Radv,0−1(f)
and analyzing the minimizers of the resulting ad-
versarial training objective. Let Hadv,0−1(f) be the
adversarial risk obtained by removing the constraint
g(x+ δ) = g(x) in Radv,0−1(f)
Hadv,0−1(f) = E
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δ), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f(x), g(x))
]
.
We call this the adversarial “smooth” risk, because by
removing the constraint, we are implicitly assuming
that the base classifier is smooth in the neighborhood
of each point. Let Hadv(f) denote the adversarial risk
obtained by replacing ℓ0−1 in Hadv,0−1(f) with a con-
vex surrogate loss ℓ.
The following Theorem studies the minimizers of the
adversarial training objective obtained using the ad-
versarial smooth risk. Specifically, it shows that if
there exists a Bayes decision rule which satisfies a
“margin condition”, then minimizing the adversarial
training objective using Hadv,0−1(f) results in Bayes
optimal classifiers.
Theorem 2. Suppose the hypothesis class F is the
set of all measurable functions. Moreover, suppose the
base classifier is a Bayes decision rule η(x) which sat-
isfies the following margin condition:
Pr ({x : ∃x˜, ‖x˜− x‖ ≤ ǫ and η(x˜) 6= η(x)}) = 0. (5)
1. (0/1 loss). If ℓ is the 0/1 loss, then any mini-
mizer of R0−1(f)+λHadv,0−1(f) is a Bayes opti-
mal classifier.
2. (Logistic loss). Suppose ℓ is the logistic loss.
Moreover, suppose the probability distribution P
is such that
∣∣P (y = 1|x)− 12 ∣∣ > γ a.e., for some
positive constant γ. Then any minimizer of
min
f∈F
R(f) + λHadv(f), (6)
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is a Bayes optimal classifier
The margin condition in Equation (5) requires the
Bayes decision rule to not change its prediction in
the neighborhood of any given point. We note that
this condition is necessary for the results of the above
Theorem to hold. In Section 5.2 we show that with-
out the margin condition, the minimizers of (6) need
not be Bayes optimal. Theorem 2 also highlights the
importance of the constraint “g(x+ δ) = g(x)” in the
definition of adversarial risk, for Bayes optimality of
the minimizers.
5.1 Replacing Base Classifier with Stochastic
Label y
A natural step is to replace g(x) in the definition of
adversarial smooth risk Hadv,0−1(·) with stochastic la-
bel y and study the properties of minimizers of the
resulting objective. Our results show that the result-
ing adversarial training objective behaves similarly as
Equation (6).
Theorem 3. Consider the setting of Theorem 2. Let
Gadv,0−1(f) be the adversarial risk obtained by replac-
ing g(x) with y in Radv,0−1(f)
Gadv,0−1(f) = E
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f(x+ δ), y)− ℓ0−1 (f(x), y)
]
.
1. (0/1 loss). If ℓ is the 0/1 loss, then any mini-
mizer of R0−1(f) +λGadv,0−1(f) is a Bayes opti-
mal classifier.
2. (Logistic loss). Suppose ℓ is the logistic loss.
Moreover, suppose the probability distribution P
is such that
∣∣P (y = 1|x)− 12 ∣∣ > γ a.e., for some
positive constant γ. Then any minimizer of
min
f∈F
R(f) + λGadv(f), (7)
is a Bayes optimal classifier
Note that, objective (1) is equivalent to objective (7)
for λ = 1. The Theorem thus shows that under the
margin condition there is no trade-off between the pop-
ularly used definition of adversarial risk and standard
risk.
5.2 Importance of Margin
If no Bayes decision rule satisfies the margin condition,
then the results of Theorems 2,3 do not hold and min-
imizers of the corresponding joint objectives need not
be Bayes optimal.
Theorem 4 (Necessity of margin). Consider the
setting of Theorem 2. Suppose no Bayes deci-
sion rule satisfies the margin condition in Equa-
tion (5). Then ∃λ0 such that ∀λ > λ0 the minimiz-
ers of the joint objectives R0−1(f) + λHadv,0−1(f) and
R0−1(f) + λGadv,0−1(f) are not Bayes optimal.
The above Theorem shows that without the margin
condition, performing adversarial training using exist-
ing definition of adversarial risk can possibly result
in a loss of standard accuracy. Next, we consider a
concrete example and empirically validate our findings
from Theorems 3, 4.
Synthetic Dataset. Consider the following data
generation process in a 2D space. Let S(c, r) denote
the axis aligned square of side length r, centered at
c. The marginal distribution of x follows a uniform
distribution on S([−2, 0]T , 2) ∪ S([2, 0]T , 2). The con-
ditional distribution of y given x is given by
y|x ∈ S([2, 0]T , 2) =
{
1, w.p. 0.7
−1, w.p. 0.3 ,
y|x ∈ S([−2, 0]T , 2) =
{
1, w.p. 0.3
−1, w.p. 0.7 .
Note that the data satisfies the margin condition in
Equation (5) w.r.t L∞ norm, for ǫ = 1 and the follow-
ing Bayes decision rule
η(x) =
{
1 if x(1) ≥ 0
−1 if x(1) < 0 .
From Theorem 3 we know that for L∞ norm pertur-
bations with ǫ ≤ 1, minimizing Equation 7 results in
Bayes optimal classifiers. To verify this, we generated
105 training samples from this distribution and min-
imized objective (7) over the set of linear classifiers.
Since the model is linear, we have a closed form expres-
sion for the adversarial risk. Moreover, objective (7)
can be efficiently solved using gradient descent. Fig-
ure 2 shows the behavior of standard risk of the result-
ing models as we vary ǫ. We can seen that for ǫ ≤ 1,
the standard risk is equal to 0.3, which is the Bayes
optimal risk. Whereas, for ǫ > 1, the standard risk
can be larger than 0.3.
Benchmark Datasets. A number of recent works
try to explain the drop in standard accuracy
in adversarially trained models [Fawzi et al., 2018,
Tsipras et al., 2018]. These works suggest that there
could be an inherent trade-off between standard and
adversarial risks. In contrast, our results show that as
long as there exists a Bayes optimal classifier with suffi-
cient margin, minimizers of objectives (1), (7) have low
standard and adversarial risks and there is no trade-off
between the two risks. The important question then is,
“Do the benchmark datasets such as MNIST [LeCun,
1998], CIFAR10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009] satisfy
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Figure 2: Standard 0/1 risk vs. perturbation radius ǫ
on the synthetic dataset, for estimators minimizing the
old adversarial risk with perturbations measured w.r.t
L∞ norm. When perturbation radius is more than
Bayes rule margin for this problem viz. 1, and when
λ is large, the standard risk is larger than the Bayes
optimal risk viz. 0.3. Note that for small λ, even if
the perturbation is larger than margin, the minimizer
is Bayes optimal.
the margin condition?” Sharif et al. [2018] try to es-
timate the margin in MNIST, CIFAR10 datasets via
user studies. Their results suggest that for L∞ pertur-
bations larger than what is typically used in practice
(ǫ = 0.1), CIFAR10 doesn’t not satisfy the margin
condition. Together with our results, this shows that
for such large perturbations, adversarial training will
result in models with low standard accuracy. However,
it is still unclear if the benchmark datasets satisfy the
margin condition for ǫ typically used in practice. We
believe answering this question can help us understand
if it possible to obtain a truly robust model, without
compromising on standard accuracy.
5.3 Standard training with increasing model
complexity
Before we conclude the section, we show how our re-
sults from Theorem 3 can be used to explain an inter-
esting phenomenon observed by Madry et al. [2017]:
even with standard risk minimization, complex net-
works result in more robust classifiers than simple net-
works. Define the standard and adversarial training
objectives as
(standard) min
f∈F
R(f),
(adversarial) min
f∈F
R(f) + λGadv(f).
Let F be a small function class, such as the set of
functions which can be represented using a particular
neural network architecture. As we increase the com-
plexity of F , we expect the minimizer of the standard
risk R(f) to move closer to a Bayes optimal classifier.
Assuming the margin condition is satisfied, from The-
orem 3 we know that the minimizer of the adversarial
training objective is also a Bayes optimal classifier.
So as we increase the complexity of F , we expect the
minimizer of the standard risk to also have low joint
adversarial + standard risk, and the minimizer of the
joint adversarial + standard risk to have low standard
risk. The latter could thus serve as an explanation
for the other empirically observed phenomenon that
performing adversarial training on increasingly com-
plex networks results in classifiers with better stan-
dard risk. Figures 3, 4 illustrate these two phenomena
on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. To ensure the mar-
gin condition is at least approximately satisfied, we use
small perturbations in these experiments. More details
about the hyper-parameteres used in the experiments
can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Lowering of adversarial + standard 0/1 risk
(i.e. joint 0/1 risk) of models obtained through standard
training, as we increase the model capacity.
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Figure 4: Lowering of standard 0/1 risk of models ob-
tained through adversarial training (with λ = 1), as we
increase the model capacity.
We conclude the discussion by pointing out that in
practice we optimize empirical risks instead of popula-
tion risks, so that our explanations above are accurate
only when empirical risks and the corresponding pop-
ulation risks have similar landscapes.
6 Importance of Adversarial Training
Recall, in Section 4 we studied the properties of ad-
versarial training when the base classifier is Bayes Op-
timal. In particular, in Theorem 1 we showed that
the minimizers of adversarial training objective (4) are
Bayes optimal classifiers, which are also the minimizers
of standard risk. This naturally leads us to the follow-
ing question: Do we really need adversarial training?
Will standard training suffice to learn robust classi-
fiers? In this section, we investigate conditions under
which standard risk minimization alone does not guar-
antee robust classifiers.
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We first consider the setting where there is a single
Bayes decision rule. Then, our theoretical results in
Theorem 1 indeed show that there is no need for adver-
sarial training, but provided we are able to find the op-
timum hypothesis over the set of all measurable func-
tions. However, in practice, we are never able to do so
due to the finite amount of data available to us. What
if we choose a smaller hypothesis class (such as the set
of linear separators)? In Section 6.1 we show that
standard risk minimization over restricted hypothe-
sis classes can result in classifiers with low standard
risk but high adversarial risk. More generally, in Sec-
tion 6.2, we show that adversarial and standard risks
are not calibrated, and that small standard risks need
not entail a small adversarial risk.
In Section 6.3, we consider the setting where there are
multiple Bayes decision rules. For instance, when the
data is separable or lies in a low-dimensional manifold,
Bayes decision rule is not unique. In this setting, even
if one has access to unlimited data (which allows us to
optimize over the space of all measurable functions),
we show that there is a need for adversarial training.
Although all the Bayes decision rules have the same
standard risk, they can differ on adversarial risk. In
such cases, it is impossible to distinguish these clas-
sifiers using standard risk. As a result, one needs to
perform adversarial training to learn a robust Bayes
decision rule.
We study these questions theoretically using a mix-
ture model where the data for each class is generated
from a different mixture component. The distribution
of x conditioned on y follows a normal distribution:
x|y ∼ N (yw∗, σ2Id), where Id ∈ Rd×d is the identity
matrix and P (y = 1) = P (y = −1) = 12 . Note that
in this setting x 7→ xTw∗ is a Bayes optimal classifier.
Moreover there is a unique Bayes decision rule.
6.1 Optimizing Standard Risk over
Restricted Function Class
We study the effect of minimizing the standard risk
over restricted function classes. Consider the re-
stricted hypothesis class of all vectors which are non-
zero in the top-k co-ordinates: Wk = {w ∈ Rd| w(i) =
0 ∀i > k}. The following result shows that the exact
minimizer of standard risk over this restricted hypoth-
esis class need not be the minimizer of the adversarial
risk over this class, even for perturbations as small as
1√
d
.
Theorem 5. Consider the Gaussian mixture model
with w∗ = [ 1√
d/2
, 1√
d/2
, . . . , 1√
d/2
]T , σ = 1 and let
w˜ = argmin
w∈Wd/2 R0−1(fw) be the minimizer of the
standard risk when restricted to Wd/2. Then, even
for a small enough perturbation of ǫ ≥ C√
d
w.r.t. L∞
norm, we have that
R0−1(fw˜)−R0−1(fw∗) < 0.1 but Radv,0−1(fw˜) > 0.95,
where Radv,0−1(·) is measured w.r.t. g(x) = sign(xTw∗).
6.2 Standard and Adversarial Risk are not
Calibrated
We next explore if the two risks are calibrated, i.e.
does approximately minimizing the standard risk al-
ways lead to small adversarial risk? Suppose the mean
of the Gaussian components is k-sparse; that is,w∗ has
k non-zero entries. Then the Bayes optimal classifier
x 7→ xTw∗ depends only on a few features and there
are a lot of irrelevant features. The following result
shows that there exist linear separators which achieve
near-optimal classification accuracy, but have a high
adversarial risk, even for a L∞ adversarial perturba-
tion of size 1√
d−k .
Theorem 6. Let w∗ be k-sparse with non-zeros in the
first k coordinates. Let w ∈ Rd be a linear separator
such that w1:k = w
∗
1:k, wk+1:d = [
±1√
d−k , . . . ,
±1√
d−k ].
Then, there exists a constant C such that if ||w∗||2 ≥ C
and σ = 1, the excess risk of fw(x) = x
T
w is small;
that is, R0−1(fw) − R∗0−1 ≤ 0.02, where R∗0−1 is the
risk of the Bayes optimal classifier. However, even
for a small enough perturbation ǫ ≥ 2‖w∗‖22√
d−k w.r.t L∞
norm, the adversarial risk satisfies
Radv,0−1(fw) ≥ 0.95,
where the base classifier g(x) is equal to sign(xTw∗).
Note that the constructed classifier w has very small
weights on irrelevant features. Hence the classification
error is low but not minimal. But since there are a lot
of such irrelevant features, there exist adversarial per-
turbations which don’t change the prediction of Bayes
classifier, but change the prediction of w.
6.3 Multiple Bayes Decision Rules
In this section, we consider the setting where there
could be multiple Bayes optimal decision rules. We
consider the question whether different Bayes optimal
solutions have different adversarial risks, and whether
standard risk minimization gives us robust Bayes op-
timal solutions.
Suppose our data comes from low dimensional Gaus-
sians embedded in a high-dimensional space, i.e. sup-
pose ||w∗||0 = k ≪ d and the covariance matrix D
of the conditional distributions x|y is diagonal with
ith diagonal entry Dii = σ
2 if w∗i 6= 0, 0 otherwise.
Notice that in this model any classifier w˜ such that
w˜1:k = w
∗
1:k is a Bayes optimal classifier. Observe
the subtle difference between this setting and sparse
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linear model. In particular, in the previous example,
the data is inherently high-dimensional, but with only
a few relevant discriminatory features; on the contrary,
here the data lies on a low dimensional manifold of a
high dimensional subspace.
In this setting, we study the adversarial risk of clas-
sifiers obtained through minimization of R(fw) using
iterative methods such as gradient descent.
Theorem 7. Let w∗ be such that ||w∗||2 ≥ C, for
some constant C. Let ǫ ≥ 2‖w∗‖22√
d−k and ℓ be any con-
vex calibrated surrogate loss ℓ(fw(x), y) = φ(yw
T
x).
Then gradient descent on R(fw) with random initial-
ization using a Gaussian distribution with covariance
1√
d−kId converges to a point wˆGD such that with high
probability,
R0,1(fwˆGD ) = 0 but Radv,0−1(fwˆGD ) ≥ 0.95,
where Radv,0−1(·) is the adversarial risk measured
w.r.t. w∗.
Note that Theorem 7 raises the vulnerability of stan-
dard risk minimization using gradient descent by show-
ing that it can lead to Bayes optimal solutions which
have high adversarial risk. Moreover, observe that in-
creasing d results in classifiers that are less robust;
even a O(1/
√
d− k) perturbation can create adversar-
ial examples with respect to w∗. All our results in
this section show that standard risk minimization is
inherently insufficient in providing robustness. This
suggests the need for adversarial training.
7 Regularization properties of
Adversarial Training
In this section, we study the regularization properties
of the adversarial training objective in Equation (4).
Specifically, we show that the adversarial risk Radv(f),
effectively acts as a regularizer which biases the solu-
tion towards certain classifiers. The following Theo-
rem explicitly shows this regularization effect of ad-
versarial risk.
Theorem 8. Let ‖.‖∗ be the dual norm of ‖.‖, which
is defined as: ‖z‖∗ = sup‖x‖=1 zTx. Suppose ℓ is the
logistic loss and suppose the classifier f is differen-
tiable a.e. Then for any ǫ ≥ 0 the adversarial training
objective (4) can be upper bounded as
R(f) + λRadv(f) ≤
R(f) + λmin
{
ǫE
[
sup‖δ‖≤ǫ ‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗
]
, 2‖f − g‖∞
}
,
where ‖f − g‖∞ = supx |f(x)− g(x)|.
Although the above Theorem only provides an upper
bound, it still provides insights into the regularization
effects of adversarial risk. It shows that adversarial
risk effectively acts as a regularization term biasing
the optimization towards two kinds of classifiers: 1)
classifiers that are smooth with small gradients and 2)
classifiers that are pointwise close to the base classifier
g(x). We now compare the regularization effect of ad-
versarial risk in objective (4) with the regularization
effect of existing notion of adversarial risk.
Theorem 9. Suppose ℓ is the logistic loss and suppose
the classifier f is differentiable a.e. Then for any ǫ ≥
0 the adversarial training objective (7) can be upper
bounded as
R(f) + λGadv(f) ≤ R(f) + λǫE
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗
]
.
Moreover, for linear classifiers fw(x) = w
T
x, the ad-
versarial training objective (7) can be upper and lower
bounded as
R(fw) + λGadv(fw) ≤ R(fw) + λǫ‖w‖∗, (8)
R(fw) + λGadv(fw) ≥ R(fw) +
(
λǫ
2
R0−1(fw)
)
‖w‖∗.
Comparing Theorems 8, 9, we can see that the ma-
jor difference between the two adversarial risks is that
the existing definition doesn’t necessarily bias the op-
timization towards the base classifier g(x), whereas
the new definition certainly biases the optimization to-
wards g(x).
For linear classifiers, the above Theorem provides a
tight upper bound and shows that adversarial train-
ing using objective (7) essentially acts as a regular-
izer which penalizes the dual norm of w. In a related
work, Xu et al. [2009] focus on linear classifiers with
hinge loss, and show that under separability conditions
on the data and certain additional constraint on per-
turbations, the robust objective is equivalent to the
regularized objective.
8 Summary and Future Work
In this work, we identified the inaccuracies with the
existing definition of adversarial risk and proposed a
new definition of adversarial risk which fixes these in-
accuracies. We analyzed the properties of minimiz-
ers of the resulting adversarial training objective and
showed that Bayes optimal classifiers are its minimiz-
ers and that there is no trade-off between adversarial
and standard risks. We also studied the existing def-
inition of adversarial risk, its relation to the new def-
inition, and identify conditions under which its mini-
mizers are Bayes optimal. Our analysis highlights the
importance of margin for Bayes optimality of its min-
imizers.
An important direction for future work would be to
design algorithms for minimization of the new adver-
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sarial training objective. One can consider two differ-
ent approaches in this direction: 1) assuming we have
black box access to the base classifier, one could de-
sign efficient optimization techniques which make use
of the black box. 2) assuming we have access to an
approximate base classifier (e.g., some complex model
which is pre-trained on a lot of labeled data from a
related domain, or a “teacher” network), one could use
this classifier as a surrogate for the base classifier, to
optimize the adversarial training objective.
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Revisiting Adversarial Risk
A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Intermediate Results
Before we present the proof of the Theorem, we present useful intermediate results which we require in our proof.
The following Lemmas present some monotonicity properties of the logistic loss.
Lemma 1. Let y be a discrete random variable such that
y =
{
1, with probability ≥ 12 + γ
−1, with probability ≤ 12 − γ
,
for some γ > 0. Let ξ = log 1+2γ1−2γ and let z < ξ be a constant. Define h(u) as follows
h(u) = Ey[log(1 + e
−y((1−u)z+uξ))].
Then h(u) is a strictly decreasing function over the domain [0, 1).
Proof. Let p = P (y = 1). The derviative of h(u), w.r.t u is given by
h′(u) = p× (z − ξ)
1 + e(1−u)z+uξ
+ (1− p)× (ξ − z)e
(1−u)z+uξ
1 + e(1−u)z+uξ
.
We will now show that h′(u) < 0. Suppose p < 1 (otherwise it is easy to see that h′(u) < 0). Then(
1+e(1−u)z+uξ
ξ−z
)
× h′(u) = −p+ (1− p)e(1−u)z+uξ
= (1− p)
(
e(1−u)z+uξ − p1−p
)
≤ (1− p) (e(1−u)z+uξ − eξ)
= (1− p)eξ (e(1−u)(z−ξ) − 1)
< 0.
Lemma 2. Let u, ξ be such that ξ > 0, u ∈ [0, 1). Define functions h1(z), h2(z) as follows
h1(z) = log(1 + e
−(1−u)z−uξ)− log(1 + e−z).
h2(z) = log(1 + e
+(1−u)z+uξ)− log(1 + ez).
Then h1(z) is an increasing function over the domain (−∞, ξ) and h2(z) is a decreasing function over (−∞, ξ).
Proof. The derivative of h1(z) w.r.t z is given by
h′1(z) = −
1− u
1 + e(1−u)z+uξ
+
1
1 + ez
.
We will now show that h′1(z) ≥ 0.
h′1(z) = − 1−u1+e(1−u)z+uξ + 11+ez
≥ − 1
1+e(1−u)z+uξ
+ 11+ez
≥ − 11+ez + 11+ez
= 0
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that u ∈ [0, 1) and the second inequality follows from the fact
that z < ξ. This shows that h1 is increasing over (−∞, ξ).
We use a similar argument to show that h′2(z) is a decreasing function. Consider the derivative of h2(z) w.r.t z
h′2(z) =
1− u
1 + e−(1−u)z−uξ
− 1
1 + e−z
.
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We will now show that h′2(z) ≤ 0.
h′2(z) =
1−u
1+e−(1−u)z−uξ
− 11+e−z
≤ 1
1+e−(1−u)z−uξ
− 11+e−z
≤ 11+e−z − 11+e−z
= 0
,
This shows that h2 is decreasing over (−∞, ξ).
A.2 Main Argument
0/1 loss. We first prove the Theorem for 0/1 loss; that is, we show that any minimizer ofR0−1(f)+λRadv,0−1(f)
is a Bayes optimal classifier. We prove the result by contradiction. Let f∗ be a Bayes optimal classifier such that
sign(f∗(x)) = g(x) a.e. Suppose fˆ is a minimizer of the joint objective. Let sign(fˆ(x)) disagree with sign(f∗(x))
over a set X of non-zero measure. We show that the joint risk of fˆ is strictly larger than f∗.
First, we show that the standard risk of fˆ is strictly larger than f∗:
R0−1(fˆ)−R0−1(f∗) = E(x,y)
[
ℓ0−1(fˆ(x), y)− ℓ0−1(f∗(x), y)
]
= Pr(x ∈ X)× E(x,y)
[
ℓ0−1(fˆ(x), y)− ℓ0−1(f∗(x), y)
∣∣∣x ∈ X]
= Pr(x ∈ X)× Ex
[
Ey
[
ℓ0−1(fˆ(x), y)− ℓ0−1(f∗(x), y)
∣∣∣x] ∣∣∣x ∈ X]
= Pr(x ∈ X)× Ex
[
P (y 6= sign(fˆ(x))|x) − P (y 6= sign(f∗(x))|x)
∣∣∣x ∈ X]
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of Bayes optimal decision rule.
We now show that the adversarial risk of fˆ is larger than f∗. Since the base classifier g agrees with f∗ a.e. we
have
Radv,0−1(f∗) = E

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ0−1 (f∗(x+ δ), g(x))− ℓ0−1 (f∗(x), g(x))

 = 0.
Since Radv,0−1 of any classifier is always non-negative, this shows that Radv,0−1(fˆ) ≥ Radv,0−1(f∗). Combining
this with the above result on classification risk we get
R0−1(fˆ) + λRadv,0−1(fˆ) > R0−1(f∗) + λRadv,0−1(f∗).
This shows that fˆ can’t be a minimizer of the joint objective and minimizer of joint objective should be a Bayes
optimal classifier.
Logistic Loss. We now consider the logistic loss and show that any minimizer of R(f) + λRadv(f) is a Bayes
optimal classifier. We again prove the result by contradiction. Let ξ = log 1+2γ1−2γ . Suppose fˆ is a minimizer of
the joint objective and is not Bayes optimal. Define set X as
X = {x : fˆ(x)g(x) < ξ}.
Note that, since fˆ is not Bayes optimal, X is a set with non-zero measure. Construct a new classifier f¯ as follows
f¯(x) =
{
fˆ(x), if x 6∈ X
fˆ(x) + τ
(
ξ − fˆ(x)g(x)
)
g(x), otherwise
,
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. We now show that f¯ has a strictly lower joint risk than fˆ . This will then
contradict our assumption that fˆ is a minimizer of the joint objective.
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Let ℓadv(f, g,x) be the adversarial risk at point x, computed w.r.t base classifier g
ℓadv(f, g,x) = max‖δ‖≤ǫ
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ (f(x+ δ), g(x)) − ℓ (f(x), g(x)) .
Define the conditional risk of f at x as
C(f,x) = Ey
[
ℓ(f(x), y)
∣∣∣x]+ λℓadv(f, g,x).
Note that Ex [C(f,x)] is equal to the joint risk R(f) + λRadv(f). We now show that C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) ≤ 0, ∀x.
Case 1. Let x 6∈ X . Then fˆ(x) = f¯(x). So we have
C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) = λ
(
ℓadv(f¯ , g,x)− ℓadv(fˆ , g,x)
)
≤ λ

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
) − ℓ(fˆ(x+ δ), g(x))


= λmax

0, max‖δ‖≤ǫ,x+δ∈X
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
) − ℓ(fˆ(x+ δ), g(x))


= 0,
where the last equality follows from the observation that g(x)f¯(x + δ) ≥ g(x)fˆ(x+ δ) and the logistic function
ℓ(z) = log(1 + e−z) is a monotonically decreasing function.
Case 2. Let x ∈ X . Then fˆ(x) 6= f¯(x). Now, consider the difference C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x):
C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) = Ey
[
ℓ(f¯(x), y) − ℓ(fˆ(x), y)
∣∣∣x]︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+λ
(
ℓadv(f¯ , g,x)− ℓadv(fˆ , g,x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
.
We show that both T1, T2 are non-positive. Using the monotonicity property of logistic loss in Lemma 1, it is
easy to verify that T1 < 0. We now bound T2. First, observe that based on our construction of f¯(x) and our
definition of set X , we have
inf
x 6∈X
f¯(x)g(x) ≥ sup
x∈X
f¯(x)g(x), inf
x 6∈X
fˆ(x)g(x) ≥ sup
x∈X
fˆ(x)g(x).
Since the logistic loss ℓ(z) = log(1+e−z) is monotonically decreasing in z, this shows that both the inner maxima
in T2 are achieved at δ’s such that x+ δ ∈ X . Using this observation, T2 can be rewritten as
λ

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ,x+δ∈X
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
)− ℓ (f¯(x), g(x))

− λ

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ,x+δ∈X
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ(fˆ(x+ δ), g(x)) − ℓ(fˆ(x), g(x))

 .
The above expression can be rewritten as
λ

 max
‖δ‖≤ǫ,x+δ∈X
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
)− max
‖δ‖≤ǫ,x+δ∈X
g(x)=g(x+δ)
ℓ(fˆ(x+ δ), g(x))

 − λ(ℓ (f¯(x), g(x)) − ℓ(fˆ(x), g(x))) .
Note that ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
)
in the above expression can equivalently be written as
ℓ
(
(1− τ)fˆ (x+ δ) + τξg(x), g(x)
)
. This shows that both ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), g(x)
)
and ℓ(fˆ(x + δ), g(x)) in the
above expression are monotonically decreasing in g(x)fˆ(x + δ) and as a result the maximum of both the inner
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objectives is achieved at a δ which minimizes g(x)fˆ (x + δ). Let δx be the point at which the maxima is
achieved. Then the above expression can be written as
T2 = λ
(
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δx), g(x)
)− ℓ(fˆ(x+ δx), g(x))) − λ(ℓ (f¯(x), g(x)) − ℓ(fˆ(x), g(x))) .
From Lemma 2 we know that ℓ
(
f¯(x), g(x)
)−ℓ(fˆ(x), g(x)) is an increasing function in fˆ(x)g(x). Since fˆ(x)g(x) ≥
fˆ(x+ δx), g(x+ δx), we have
T2 ≤ 0.
Combining the bounds for T1 and T2 we obtain C(f¯ ,x)−C(fˆ ,x) < 0, for any x ∈ X . This shows that f¯(x) has a
strictly lower joint risk than fˆ . So fˆ can’t be a minimizer of the joint risk. This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 3, because under the margin condition Hadv,0−1(f) is equivalent to
Gadv,0−1(f) when the label y is a deterministic function of x.
C Proof of Theorem 3
0/1 loss. We first prove the Theorem for 0/1 loss. We use a similar proof strategy as Theorem 1 and prove
the result by contradiction. Let η(x) be a Bayes decision rule which satisfies the margin condition. Let f∗ be a
Bayes optimal classifier such that sign(f∗(x)) = η(x) a.e. Suppose fˆ is a minimizer of the joint objective. Let
sign(fˆ(x)) disagree with sign(f∗(x)) over a set X of non-zero measure. From the proof of Theorem 1 we know
that R0−1(fˆ)−R0−1(f∗) > 0.
We now show that fˆ has a larger adversarial risk than f∗. From the definition of Gadv,0−1(f∗) we have
Gadv,0−1(f∗) = E(x,y)
[
max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f∗(x + δ), y)− ℓ0−1 (f∗(x), y)
]
.
From margin condition in Equation (5) we know that ∀x, ‖δ‖ ≤ ǫ, sign(f∗(x + δ)) = η(x + δ) = η(x). So
Gadv,0−1(f∗) = 0.
Since Gadv,0−1 of any classifier is always non-negative, this shows that Gadv,0−1(fˆ) ≥ Gadv,0−1(f∗). Combining
this with the above result on classification risk we get
R0−1(fˆ) + λGadv,0−1(fˆ) > R0−1(f∗) + λGadv,0−1(f∗).
This shows that fˆ can’t be a minimizer of the joint objective. This shows that any minimizer of Equation (7) is
a Bayes optimal classifier.
Logistic loss. To prove the Theorem for logistic loss, we heavily rely on some of the intermediate results we
proved for Theorem 1. Let ξ = log 1+2γ1−2γ . Suppose fˆ is a minimizer of the joint objective and is not Bayes
optimal. Define set X as
X = {x : fˆ(x)η(x) < ξ}.
Note that X is a set with non-zero measure. Construct f¯ as follows
f¯(x) =
{
fˆ(x), if x 6∈ X
fˆ(x) +
(
ξ − fˆ(x)η(x)
)
τη(x), otherwise
,
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. We now show that f¯ has a strictly lower joint risk than fˆ .
Define the conditional risk of f at x as
C(f,x) = Ey
[
ℓ(f(x), y)
∣∣∣x]+ λEy [max‖δ‖≤ǫ ℓ (f(x+ δ), y)− ℓ (f(x), y)
∣∣∣x] .
We consider two cases, x ∈ X and x 6∈ X , and show that in both the cases f¯ has a lower conditional risk than fˆ .
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Case 1. Let x 6∈ X . Then fˆ(x) = f¯(x). So we have
C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) = λE
[
max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), y
)− max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
fˆ(x+ δ), y
) ∣∣∣x]
= λP (y = η(x)|x)
[
max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ), η(x)
) − max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
fˆ(x+ δ), η(x)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+λP (y = −η(x)|x)
[
max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
f¯(x+ δ),−η(x)) − max
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
fˆ(x + δ),−η(x)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
Using the margin condition on η(x), and using the same technique as in proof of Case 1 of Theorem 1, we can
show that T1 ≤ 0. Since both the inner maxima in T2 are achieved at x+ δ 6∈ X , it is easy to verify that T2 = 0.
This shows that ∀x 6∈ X,C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) ≤ 0.
Case 2. Let x ∈ X . Let ℓadv(f,x, y) be the adversarial risk at point (x, y)
ℓadv(f,x, y) = max‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ (f(x+ δ), y)− ℓ (f(x), y) .
We have
C(f¯ ,x)− C(fˆ ,x) = E
[
ℓ(f¯(x), y)− ℓ(fˆ(x), y)
∣∣∣x]︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+λEy
[
ℓadv(f¯ ,x, y)− ℓadv(fˆ ,x, y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
From the proof of Case 2 of Theorem 1 we know that T3 < 0. We now show that T4 ≤ 0. Let px = P (y = η(x)|x).
T4 can be decomposed as follows
px
(
ℓadv(f¯ ,x, η(x)) − ℓadv(fˆ ,x, η(x))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T5
+(1− px)
(
ℓadv(f¯ ,x,−η(x)) − ℓadv(fˆ ,x,−η(x))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T6
.
Following the proof of Case 2 of Theorem 1 and using the margin condition we can show that T5 ≤ 0. We now
show that T6 ≤ 0. First observe that both the suprema in T6 either occur at the same point. Suppose both the
suprema in T6 occur outside X . Then T6 is given by
T6 = ℓ(fˆ(x),−η(x)) − ℓ(f¯(x),−η(x)) ≤ 0.
Suppose both the suprema occur inside X . Then using the observation that ℓ(f¯(x),−η(x)) − ℓ(fˆ(x),−η(x)) is
a decreasing function of fˆ(x)η(x) (see Lemma 2), we get T6 ≤ 0.
D Proof of Theorem 4
For any Bayes decision rule η(x), let Xη be the set of points which violate the margin condition
Xη = {x : ∃x˜, ‖x˜− x‖ ≤ ǫ and η(x˜) 6= η(x)} .
Since no Bayes decision rule satisfies the margin condition, we have Pr(x ∈ Xη) > 0, ∀η. Let p = infη Pr(x ∈ Xη).
We first consider the joint risk R0−1(f)+λGadv,0−1(f). To prove the Theorem we show that there exist classifiers
which obtain strictly lower joint risk than any Bayes optimal classifier. Let f∗ : Rd → R be any Bayes optimal
classifier, with the corresponding Bayes decision rule η(x) = sign(f∗(x)). We first obtain a lower bound on
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Gadv,0−1(f∗). Consider the following
Gadv,0−1(f∗) ≥ Pr(x ∈ Xη)× E(x,y)
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f∗(x+ δ), y)− ℓ0−1 (f∗(x), y)
∣∣∣x ∈ Xη
]
≥ Pr(x ∈ Xη)× Ex
[
P (y = η(x)|x)
(
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f∗(x + δ), η(x)) − ℓ0−1 (f∗(x), η(x))
) ∣∣∣x ∈ Xη
]
≥ Pr(x ∈ Xη)
2
Ex
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ0−1 (f∗(x+ δ), η(x)) − ℓ0−1 (f∗(x), η(x))
∣∣∣x ∈ Xη
]
≥ Pr(x ∈ Xη)
2
≥ p
2
where the third inequality follows from the fact that P (y = η(x)|x) ≥ 12 and the fourth inequality follows from
the observation that any x ∈ Xη violates the margin condition. This gives us the following lower bound on the
joint risk of f∗
R0−1(f∗) + λGadv,0−1(f∗) ≥ λp
2
. (9)
Now consider the “constant” classifier f−1 which assigns all the points to the negative class. This classifier has 0
adversarial risk. So its joint risk can be upper bounded as follows
R0−1(f−1) + λGadv,0−1(f−1) ≤ 1. (10)
Equations (9), (10) show that ∀λ > 2p , there exist classifiers with strictly lower joint risk than any Bayes
optimal classifier. Using the same argument we can show that similar results hold for the other joint risk
R0−1(f) + λHadv,0−1(f).
E Proofs of Section 6
Here we present the proofs of Section 6. To begin with, we first present a result which characterizes the standard
and adversarial risk for the mixture model.
Theorem 10. Suppose the perturbations are measured w.r.t L∞ norm. Let w ∈ Rp be a linear separator and
moreover suppose the base classifier g(x) is the Bayes optimal decision rule. Then, for any linear classifier
fw(x) = w
T
x, we have that
1. R0−1(fw) = Φ
(
−wTw∗σ||w||2
)
,
2. Gadv,0−1(fw) = Φ
( ||w||1ǫ−wTw∗
σ||w||2
)
,
3. Radv,0−1(fw) ≤ Φ
( ||w−w∗||1ǫ−(w−w∗)Tw∗
σ||w−w∗||2
)
,
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
Proof. To see the first part, we begin by observing that wTx is a univariate normal random variable when
conditioned on the label y, one can derive the 0-1 error for the classifier in closed form. In particular,
R0−1(fw) = 1− 1
2
Φ
(
w
T
w
∗
σ ||w||2
)
− 1
2
Φ
(
w
T
w
∗
σ ||w||2
)
= 1− Φ
(
w
T
w
∗
σ ||w||2
)
= Φ
(−wTw∗
σ ||w||2
)
Following the existing definition of adversarial risk, we see that
Gadv,0−1(f) = E
[
max
δ:||δ||
∞
≤ǫ
ℓ0−1(f(x+ δ), y)
]
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We consider the case of y = 1. We know that x|y = 1 ∼ N (w∗, σ2Id). So, x = w∗ + z, where z ∼ N (0, σ2Id).
Now, for any z, we incur a loss of 1, whenever there exists a δ such that ||δ||∞ ≤ ǫ and,
w
T (x+ δ) = wT (w∗) +wT (z) +wT δ ≤ 0,
As long as z is such that, wT z ≤ ||w||1 ǫ −wTw∗, we will always incur a penalty. Now, wT z ∼ N (0, σ2 ||w||22),
therefore, Pr(wT z ≤ ||w||1 ǫ−wTw∗) = Φ( ||w||1ǫ−w
T
w
∗
||w||2σ ). Symmetric argument holds for y = −1. Hence, we get
that,
Gadv,0−1(fw) = Φ
( ||w||1 ǫ−wTw∗
||w||2 σ
)
Now to prove the third claim, we have that
• Suppose y = 1, then x = w∗ + z where z ∼ N (0, σ2Id). Suppose w∗Tx > 0.
• Then, for a given z, we will incur a penalty if z satisfies the following constraints:
– We have that wTx = wTw∗ +w∗T z > 0.
– There exists a δ s.t. ||δ||∞ ≤ ǫ, such that,
w
∗T (x+ δ) > 0 and wT (x+ δ) < 0
– Note that whenever the above event happens, the following also happens:
(w −w∗)T (x+ δ) = (w −w∗)T (z) + (w −w∗)T (w∗) + (w −w∗)Tδ < 0
Now, for a given z, (w−w∗)T (z) ∼ N (0, ||w−w∗||22)σ2. Also, as long as z is such that (w−w∗)T (z) ≤||w −w∗||1 ǫ− (w −w∗)Tw∗, we will incur a penalty. This event happens with probability,
Φ
( ||w −w∗||1 ǫ− (w −w∗)Tw∗
σ ||w −w∗||2
)
This establishes the upper bound.
E.1 Proof of Theorem 6
We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 10. Let R∗ = R0−1(fw∗). Using Theorem 10, we can write
the excess 0-1 risk of w as:
R0−1(fw)−R∗ = Φ

− ||w∗||22
σ
(√
||w∗||22 + 1
)

− Φ
(
−||w
∗||2
σ
)
R0−1(fw)−R∗ = Φ

− ||w∗||2
σ
(√
1 + 1||w∗||22
)

− Φ
(
−||w
∗||2
σ
)
Next, we lower bound the adversarial risk. Suppose that y = 1, then we have that x = w∗+ zS + zSc . Similarly,
let w = wS + wSc . In our case, wS = w
∗ and wSc = α = [ ±1√d−k ,
±1√
d−k , . . . ,
±1√
d−k ]
T . Then, we have that
w
T
x = w∗Tw∗ +w∗T zS +αT zSc .
• Consider the Event αT zSc > −w∗Tw∗ −w∗T zS This is the event that w,w∗ agree before perturbation.
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• Consider the Event B,
αT zSc < ||α||1 ǫ−w∗Tw∗ −w∗T zS
This is the event that there exists a perturbation restricted to the subspace Sc such that, wT (x + δ) < 0.
Note that since the perturbation is restricted to Sc, w∗’s prediction doesn’t change.
• Now for the probability that both events happen:
– Observe that A = (αT zSc +w
∗T
z) ∼ N (0, σ2(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)).
– So, the probability of both events happening is that the random variable −w∗Tw∗ ≤ A ≤ ||α||1 ǫ −
w
∗T
w
∗
Φ

 ||α||1 ǫ−w∗Tw∗
σ
√
(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)

− Φ

 −w∗Tw∗
σ
√
(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)


– Now, for ǫ = 2 ||w∗||22 /
√
d− k, we get that the probability that both events happens is:
Φ

 w∗Tw∗
σ
√
(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)

− Φ

 −w∗Tw∗
σ
√
(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)

 = 2Φ

 w∗Tw∗
σ
√
(||α||22 + ||w∗||22)

− 1
– Now, for w
∗T
w
∗
σ
√
(||α||22+||w∗||22)
= 2, Radv,0−1(f) > 0.95
– Note that ||α||22 = 1. Therefore for σ = 1, we get that ||w∗||22 = 2 + 2 ∗
√
2.
– At this value, we have that excess 0-1 risk < 0.02, which completes the proof.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 5
We know that w∗ = [1/
√
d/2, 1/
√
d/2, . . . , 1/
√
d/2] ∈ Rp. When restricted to only top half co-ordinates, it is
easy to see that w = [1/
√
d/2, . . . , 1/
√
d/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
d/2
, 0, . . . , 0] is the optimizer of the standard risk. For this setting, from
Theorem 10, we get that,
R0−1(fw∗) = Φ(−
√
2) = 0.07, R0−1(fw) = Φ(−1) = 0.16
Hence, we have that R0−1(fw) − R0−1(fw∗) < 0.1. Now, to get a lower bound on the adversarial risk of w,
consider the perturbations of the form γ = [−ǫ,−ǫ, . . . ,−ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
d/2
, ǫ, ǫ, . . . , ǫ]. Note that for such a perturbation γ, we
have that,
w
∗T
x = w∗T (x+ γ) and wT (x+ γ) = wTx− ǫ
√
d
2
Now, suppose y = 1. Then, x = w∗ + z, where z ∼ N (0, Id). For this, we have that,
w
∗T (x) = w∗Tw∗ +w∗T z = 2 +wT1:d/2z1:d/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+wT1:d/2zd/2:d︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,
On the other hand, wTx = wTw∗ +wT z = 1 +wT1:d/2z1:d/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
. Consider the event such that
w
∗T
x > 0 & wTx > 0 & wT (x + γ) < 0.
This is the event that x is such that both of w and w∗ agree before, but after adding the perturbation γ the
prediction of w changes. Following the form of γ, this event can be rewritten as:
w
∗T
x > 0 & wTx > 0 & wT (x) < ǫ
√
d/2
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Rewriting this event in terms of the random variables A and B, we get the equivalent event,
2 +A+B > 0 & A+ 1 > 0 & A+ 1 < ǫ
√
d/2,
where A and B are independent and zero-mean unit variance gaussians, i.e. A,B ∼ N (0, 1). We just need to
lower bound the probability of this event. Consider the distribution of A conditioned on A + B > −2, suppose
its CDF is F , then the probability of the event above is F (ǫ
√
d/2 − 1)− F (−1). Now, to derive an expression
for F ,
F (a) = P (A ≤ a|(A+B) > −2) = P (A ≤ a & ((A+B) > −2))
P ((A+B) > −2) ,
Using that A+B ∼ N (0, 2), we get
F (a) = (1− Φ(−√2)))
∫ a
−∞
P (B > −2− u)φ(u)du
where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the cdf and pdf of standard normal. Hence, we get that for a suitable constant ǫ ≥ C/√d
the probability of this event is lower bounded by 0.95.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Suppose gradient descent is initialized at w0. Let wt be the tth iterate of GD. Note that the gradients of
the loss function are always in the span of the covariates xi. Hence, any iterate of gradient descent lies in
w
0 + span({xi}ni=1). Let S be the indices corresponding to the non-zero entries in w∗. Since the covariates lie
in a low dimensional subspace and are 0 outside the subspace, the co-ordinates of wt satisfy the invariant,
w
t
Sc = w
0
Sc .
Moreover, since we initialized w0 using a random gaussian initialization with covariance 1√
d−kId, we know that
with high probability, ∣∣∣∣w0Sc∣∣∣∣1 = √d− k and ∣∣∣∣w0Sc∣∣∣∣2 = O(1)
Next, we lower bound the adversarial risk. Suppose we fix y = 1, then we have that for any x = w∗ + zS . Note
that zcS = 0.
We can rewrite the wˆGD = w = wS+wSc︸︷︷︸
=α
where wS is the component in the low dimensional mixture subspace,
and α is the component in the complementary subspace Sc. As stated above, since the covariates lie in a low
dimensional subspace, hence, the component in the complementary subspace doesn’t get updated. Therefore,
α = w0Sc .
Now, for any x, we have that
wˆ
T
GDx = w
T
x
= wT (w∗ + zS + zSc︸︷︷︸
=0
)
= wTSw
∗ +wTSzS
• Consider the event wTSzS > −wTSw∗. This is the event that w,w∗ agree before perturbation.
• Consider the event B such that,
w
T
SzS < ||α||1 ǫ−wTSw∗
This is the event that there exists a perturbation restricted to the subspace Sc such that, the prediction of
wˆGD changes, i.e. w
T (x+ δ) < 0. Note that since the perturbation is restricted to Sc, the prediction of w∗
doesn’t change.
• Hence, both events happen if
−wTSw∗ ≤ wTSzS ≤ ||α||1 ǫ −wTSw∗
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• To bound this probability, observe that wTS zS ∼ N (0, σ2 ||wS ||22). Hence,
Pr
(−wTSw∗ ≤ wTSzS ≤ ||α||1 ǫ −wTSw∗) = Φ
( ||α||1 ǫ−wTSw∗
σ ||wS ||2
)
− Φ
(−wTSw∗
σ ||wS ||2
)
• We know that from our initialization, ||α||1 =
∣∣∣∣w0Sc ∣∣∣∣1 = √d− k. Hence, for ǫ = 2wTSw∗/(√d− k), we get
that both the events happen with probability,
Φ
(
w
T
Sw
∗
σ ||wS ||2
)
− Φ
(−wTSw∗
σ ||wS ||2
)
= 2Φ
(
w
T
Sw
∗
σ ||wS ||2
)
− 1
• Since as gradient descent progresses, wS → w∗, this implies that for σ = 1, and ||wS ||2 = 2, we have that
Radv,0−1(wS) > 0.95 for a very small ǫ such that ǫ = C√d−k , where C > 0 is a small constant.
Plugging this into Theorem 10, we recover the result.
F Proof of Theorem 8
1. First note that f(x+ δ) can be written as
f(x+ δ) = f(x) +
∫ 1
t=0
∇f(x+ tδ)T δdt.
Rearranging the terms gives us:
|f(x+ δ)− f(x)| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
t=0
∇f(x+ tδ)Tδdt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ sup‖δ‖≤ǫ ‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗.
Let u(x) = ǫ sup‖δ‖≤ǫ ‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗. Since the loss ℓ is 1-Lipschitz, we can upper bound ℓ(f(x+ δ), y) as
ℓ(f(x+ δ), g(x)) − ℓ(f(x), g(x)) ≤ |f(x+ δ)− f(x)| ≤ ǫ sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗.
So we have the following upper bound for the objective in Equation (4)
R(f) + λRadv(f) ≤ R(f) + ǫλE
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
‖∇f(x+ δ)‖∗
]
. (11)
2. We now get a different upper bound for |ℓ(f(x+ δ), g(x+ δ)) − ℓ(f(x), g(x))| in terms of ‖f − g‖∞. Since
ℓ is 1-Lipschitz we have
|ℓ(f(x+ δ), g(x+ δ))− ℓ(f(x), g(x))| ≤ |f(x+ δ)g(x+ δ)− f(x)g(x)|.
Note that |f(x)g(x)| can be upper bounded by |f(x)− g(x)|. This gives us the following bound
|ℓ(f(x+ δ), g(x+ δ))− ℓ(f(x), g(x))| ≤ |f(x)− g(x)|+ |f(x+ δ)− g(x+ δ)|
Substituting this in the definition of Radv(f) gives us the following upper bound for the objective in Equation (4)
R(f) + λRadv(f) ≤ R(f) + 2λ‖f − g‖∞. (12)
Combining Equations (11), (12) gives us the required result.
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G Proof of Theorem 9
The proof of part (a) and upper bound of part (b) of the Theorem follow from the proof of Theorem 8. Here,
we focus on proving the lower bound of part (b). The adversarial risk used in Equation (7) can be rewritten as
Gadv(fw) = E
[
sup
‖δ‖≤ǫ
ℓ
(
w
T (x+ δ), y
)− ℓ (wTx, y)
]
.
Since ℓ
(
w
T (x+ δ), y
)
is maximized at a point where ywT (x+ δ) is minimized, we get the following expression
for Gadv(fw)
Gadv(fw) = E
[
ℓ
(
w
T
x− yǫ‖w‖∗, y
)− ℓ (wTx, y)] .
We now obtain a lower bound for Gadv(fw)
Gadv(fw) = P (yw
T
x ≤ 0)× E
[
ℓ
(
w
T
x− yǫ‖w‖∗, y
)− ℓ (wTx, y) ∣∣∣ywTx ≤ 0]
+P (ywTx > 0)× E
[
ℓ
(
w
T
x− yǫ‖w‖∗, y
)− ℓ (wTx, y) ∣∣∣ywTx > 0]
≥ P (ywTx ≤ 0)× E
[
ℓ
(
w
T
x− yǫ‖w‖∗, y
)− ℓ (wTx, y) ∣∣∣ywTx ≤ 0] .
(13)
Consider the logistic loss ℓ(z) = log 1 + e−z. For z < 0, the absolute value of derivative of logistic loss is greater
than 12 . This shows that for (x, y) such that yw
T
x ≤ 0, we have
ℓ
(
w
T
x− yǫ‖w‖∗, y
)− ℓ (wTx, y) ≥ 1
2
ǫ‖w‖∗.
This completes the proof of the Theorem. Substituting this in the above lower bound for the adversarial risk
Gadv(fw), we get
Gadv(fw) ≥ 1
2
ǫR0−1(fw)‖w‖∗.
H Choice of λ
In this section we highlight the importance of choosing an appropriate hyper-parameter λ in Equation (7). Most
of the existing works [Madry et al., 2017, Kolter and Wong, 2017] on adversarial training always choose λ = 1 for
minimization of (7). However, we note that λ = 1 may not always be the optimal choice. Indeed λ captures the
tradeoff between two distinct objects: the classification risk, and the excess risk due to adversarial perturbations,
and it is thus quite natural to expect the optimal tradeoff to occur at values other than λ = 1. Figure 5 shows
the behavior of various risks of models obtained by minimizing objective (7) on CIFAR10, for various choices of
λ. We use VGG11 network with reduced capacity, where we reduce the number of units in each layer to 1/4th. It
can be seen that as λ increases adversarial risk goes down, but classification risk goes up, and an optimal choice
of λ should be based on the metric one cares about. If one cares about the joint risk then λ = 2 has slightly
better performance than λ = 1.
I Experimental Settings
In all our experiments we use the following network architectures:
MNIST. For all our experiments on MNIST, we use 1 hidden layer neural network with ReLU activations. To
control the capacity of the network we vary the number of hidden units.
CIFAR10. For all our experiments on CIFAR10, we use VGG11 network. To control the capacity of the
network we scale the number of units in each layer. By a capacity scale of α, we mean that we use α times the
number of units in each layer of original VGG network.
PGD Training. In all our experiments we measure adversarial perturbations w.r.t L∞ norm and use projected
gradient descent as our adversary. For PGD training on MNIST, we optimize the inner maximization problem for
50 iterations with step size 0.01. For PGD training on CIFAR10, we optimize the inner maximization problem
for 15 iterations with step size 0.005. The outer minimization is run for 40 epochs for MNIST and 50 epochs for
CIFAR10 and we use SGD+momentum with learning rate 0.01 and batch size 128.
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Figure 5: Figure shows the behavior of various risks obtained by adversarial training with ǫ = 0.03, with varying
λ. The adversarial perturbations in both the experiments are measured w.r.t L∞ norm.
Computation of adversarial risk. We use adversarial examples generated by PGD to compute the adver-
sarial risk of a classifier. The hyper-parameter settings are the same as the one used for PGD training.
